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I. INTRODUCTION
The toxic effects of decades of twentieth century industrial
growth have begun to arrive at our doorsteps recently, disrupting
both our physical and mental well-being.' The incidents at Love
1. The psychic impact of large scale environmental stressors is becoming
increasingly well documented in the practice and research of mental health ex-
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Canal, Three Mile Island and Times Beach, Missouri are only the
most famous of hundreds of industry-related fiascos that intrude
upon the lives of unsuspecting neighbors or employees of dan-
gerous facilities every year in the United States. 2
Although Congress has enacted several bills aimed at limiting
the likelihood of environmental disasters and providing for clean-
up of hazardous sites, 3 American courts have continued to limit
tort liability of industry giants who handle hazardous materials in
perts. See, e.g., Robert J. Gatchel et al., A Psychological Field Study of Stress at Three
Mile Island, 22 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 175 (1985). Additionally, "large numbers of
Americans claim that they themselves personally worry a great deal about envi-
ronmental problems which could affect them directly." George Gallup, Jr. and
Frank Newport, Americans Strongly in Tune with the Purpose of Earth Day, GALLUP
POLL MONTHLY, Apr. 1990, at 5. See also Government's Report on Radon Prompts
Public Concern, Action, GALLUP REPORT, Feb. 1989, at 33 [hereinafter Government's
Report on Radon]. The more Americans learn about the dangers and abundance
of industrial toxins, the more justifiable, and thus compensable, is the distress
they feel. See, e.g. ,Jackson v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 414 (5th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986) (explaining that where plaintiff's
fear of cancer was exacerbated each time he learned of another asbestos related
death, court cannot gainsay that plaintiff's anguish is not genuine or
reasonable).
2. The Environmental Protection Agency has counted in excess of 32,000
hazardous waste sites around the United States, while some agencies contend
that the number is closer to 51,000 and claim that up to 34,000 pose "significant
problems." Michael H. Brown, Love Canal and the Poisoning of America, ATLANTIC,
Dec. 14, 1979, at 33, 38 [hereinafter Brown, Poisoning of America].
The opportunities mental health experts have had to assess the emotional
sequelae to disasters is augmented by the surprising frequency of natural disas-
ters, including floods, typhoons, hurricanes, cyclones, tornadoes and earth-
quakes. From 1947 to 1973, one study found that the number of natural
disasters worldwide killing more than 100 people or causing more than
$1,000,000 in damages totalled 836, an average of 31 per year. Judith Dworkin,
NAT. HAZARDS RES: Global Trends in Natural Disasters 194 7-1973 (University of To-
ronto No. 26, 1973); Kenneth Hewitt & Lesley Sheehan, A Pilot Survey of Global
Natural Disasters of the Past Twenty Years, NAT. HAZARDS RES. (University of To-
ronto No. 11, 1969).
The potential danger in the United States due to industrial toxins remains
high. Brown, Poisoning of America, supra at 33. As of 1979, approximately 35 mil-
lion tons of hazardous wastes were generated by the United States each year,
and federal figures estimated that upwards of 90 percent was disposed of im-
properly. Id. See also S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980) (citing EPA
estimates supporting 90 percent figure).
3. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide & Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7
U.S.C. §§ 136 (1988); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2671 (1988); Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1988); Safe Water Drinking Act (SWDA), 42 U.S.C. § 300f
(1988); National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370
(1988); Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992
(1988); Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. 1991);
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988); Hazardous Materials Transporta-
tion Act (HMTA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1813 (1988).
2
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a negligent manner.4 These protectionist policies remain as arti-
facts of the Industrial Revolution, 5 when, as a matter of national
policy, individual safety was commonly subordinated to the ends
of commercial growth. 6
The courts of the Industrial Revolution, however, did not
and could not foresee the magnitude of modern industry and the
ways in which it would encroach upon the safety and serenity of
millions of lives. 7 Consequently, although limitations on liability
may have appeared justifiable in that era, the growing evidence of
the hazards of modem industrial practices calls for greater ac-
countability of those responsible for handling today's ultra toxic
substances.8
A primary example of courts' anachronistic protectionism in
these matters is in the limits that are set on recovery for emo-
tional distress damages in toxic tort litigation.9 Although there is
no more common or reasonable phenomenon in toxic tort cases
than the extreme emotional upset attendant to a plaintiff's dis-
covering that she has been exposed to life-threatening doses of
industrial carcinogens, courts continue to require that the plain-
tiff prove physical injury in order to recover for emotional
distress. 10
4. For a discussion of the history of recovery limitations, see infra notes 17-
54 and accompanying text.
5. Robert A. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling in the Twentieth Century: Technological
Risk, Uncertainty and Emotional Distress, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 83, 110 (1984) [herein-
after Bohrer, Fear and Trembling].
6. See, e.g., Lexington & O.R.R. Applegate, 8 Dana 289 (Ky. 1839) (recog-
nizing inevitability of "private injury and personal damage.., from ... agents of
transportation in a populous and prospering country"). See also Bohrer, Fear and
Trembling, supra note 5, at 110-11 (discussing differences between present and
gilded age which justifies ascription of liability now that we would not have
wanted to burden industry with at that time).
7. During the Industrial Revolution, American courts were actually con-
cerned with finding ways to minimize corporate liability. Cornelius J. Peck, Negli-
gence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 46 Wash L. Rev. 225 (1971). "Society
as a whole stood to benefit from the working of an industrial economy, and as a
general proposition it could not afford to burden itself with compensating those
individuals who were so unfortunate as to be injured accidentally by an instru-
ment of progress." Id. at 231.
8. See Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5, at 86-92 (describing differ-
ences between nineteenth and twentieth century America in terms of differential
importance of industrial growth and magnitude of hazards posed by industry).
For further discussion of the differences between modern conditions and those
of the industrial revolution, see infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the present and changing law regarding emotional
distress recovery in toxic tort litigation, see infra notes 87-141 and accompany-
ing text.
10. See, e.g.,Jackson v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.),
19921
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The harm worked by these draconian limitations is most evi-
dent when one realizes that, due to the latency of many disease
processes, " I the carcinogenic and/or lethal physical manifestations
of toxin-induced disease may take years to emerge.' 2 Thus,
where a plaintiff can sue for psychic harm only after a physical in-
jury develops, extreme emotional upset suffered prior to the on-
set of the physical disease process, often years in the future, may
go entirely without remedy.' 3
This Comment explores the historical treatment of emotional
distress tort damages, with particular focus on the various limita-
tions to which they have been subject.' 4 Although there has been
a gradual movement in the direction of liberalizing recovery for
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986) (emotional distress recovery only if distress
causes physical harm); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354 (1896), over-
ruled by Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961) (no recovery for fright alone
without physical impact).
11. For a discussion of the latency of diseases caused by many of today's
toxins, see infra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
12. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5, at 87 n.9 (citing COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY - 1980 at 190, 193 (1980))
(latency period between exposure to carcinogen and appearance of tumor may
be as long as forty years).
13. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling supra note 5, at 87. The most likely explana-
tion for such limitations, is the judicial, as well as public, skepticism about the
seriousness or genuiness of emotional distress incurred in such cases. Id. at 94.
Authorities have often commented on the fear of a floodgate of fraudulent
claims, or the preference for toughening the public hide rather than encourag-
ing oversensitivity to the realities of life in a technological society. Tobin v.
Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 617 (1969) (discussing need to keep liability "within
tolerable limits required by public policy"), overruled by Wolfe v. Sibley, 36
N.Y.2d 505 (1975) (finding psychic trauma compensable to same extent as phys-
ical injury).
Judicial and public skepticism notwithstanding, the emotional impact of di-
sasters, both natural and man-made, has been extensively documented. See, e.g.,
Evelyn L. Bromet et al., Long-term Mental Health Consequences of the Accident at Three
Mile Island, 19 INT'LJ. MENT. HEALTH 48 (1990); Mary A. Dew et al., A Compara-
tive Analysis of Two Community Stressors' Long-term Mental Health Effects, 15 AM. J. OF
COMMUNrrY PSYCHOLOGY 167 (1987); Lois Gibbs, Community Response to an Emer-
gency Situation: Psychological Destruction and the Love Canal, 11 AM. J. OF COMMUNITY
PSYCHOLOGY 115 (1983); Andrew Baum et al., Emotional, Behavioral, and Physiolog-
ical Effects of Chronic Stress at Three Mile Island, 51 J. CONS. AND CLIN. PSYCHOLOGY
565 (1983); GOLDINE C. GLESSER ET AL., PROLONGED PSYCHOSOCIAL EFFECTS OF
DISASTER: A STUDY OF BUFFALO CREEK (1981); S.T. Boyd, Psychological Reactions of
Disaster Victims, 60 S. AFR. MED.J. 744 (1981); Charles B. Wilkinson, Aftermath of a
Disaster: The Collapse of the Hyatt Regency Hotel Skywalks, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1134 (1983); Paul Chodoff, Late Effects of the Concentration Camp Syndrome, 8
ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 323 (1963); F. Hocking, Extreme Environmental
Stress and Its Significance for Psychopathology, 24 AM.J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 4, 23 (1970).
14. For a discussion of the conditions that have been placed on recovery for
emotional distress historically, see infra notes 17-54 and accompanying text.
4
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emotional distress damages in toxic tort litigation,' 5 this Com-
ment will assert that anything short of an unqualified foreseeabil-
ity analysis fails to provide both just redress for plaintiffs' injuries
and the necessary deterrent to negligent management of toxic
hazards. 16
II. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
RECOVERY
American courts traditionally have been wary about permit-
ting recovery for emotional distress.' 7 The predominant reasons
cited for this caution have been the fear of a floodgate of fraudu-
lent and/or frivolous litigation and a fear of a chilling effect on
industrial innovation. 18 As a result, courts have typically permit-
ted emotional distress recovery only if accompanied by physical
15. For a discussion of cases which have liberalized recovery for emotional
distress damages, see infra notes 96-141 and accompanying text.
16. It is submitted that one of the goals of our tort system should be to
deter the foreseeable harm, including distress, caused by negligent industry ac-
tions that lead to uninvited exposure of citizens to hazardous substances. Given
the eradication of such foreseeable distress as a goal, it is thus appropriate to
ascribe liability thereto. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & RICHARD N. PEARSON, THE
TORTS PROCESS 39 (3d ed. 1988) (deterrence of negligent conduct one of goals
of tort liability).
17. See Spade v. Lynn & Bos. R.R., 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897) (requiring persons
merely negligent to "guard against fright and the consequences of fright ...
would open a wide door for unjust claims").
The first English case to allow recovery for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress without resulting physical harm was at the turn of the century. See
Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q.B. 57 (1897). The first American court to allow re-
covery for emotional distress without a concomitant showing of physical harm
was in 1952. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal.
1952) (upholding claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
18. PAGE KEETON AND WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAw OF TORTS 356 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. See also
Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5, at 95. As Professor Bohrer points out:
[a]t each stage in the development of the emotional distress doctrine, it
has been necessary to rebut both objections. As for the first objection,
it is often quite clear from the surrounding circumstances that the emo-
tional distress claim is genuine .... As for the second objection, the
courts have never expanded recovery for emotional distress without
having initially reached the conclusion that the activity of the defendant
either does not need or does not merit protection.
Id. The circumstances in a great deal of toxic tort litigation leave little room to
doubt the genuiness of the distress. See, e.g., Ayers v. Twp. ofJackson, 525 A.2d
287 (N.J. 1987) (plaintiffs drank water with well-known carcinogens for six years,
followed by two years without running water); see also Robert J. Gatchel et al., A
Psychophysiological Field Study of Stress at Three Mile Island, 22 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY
175 (1985); Lois Gibbs, Community Response to an Emergency Situation: Psychological
Destruction and the Love Canal, 11 AM. J. OF COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY 115 (1983).
Moreover, submits Professor Bohrer, in a highly developed society where
new risks to the environment and human health continue to appear, courts
19921
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injury, which, because of its supposedly more verifiable nature,
was deemed to ensure the genuiness of the emotional distress
claim.' 9 This so-called "parasitic recovery" limitation was gener-
ally seen as effectuating a balance between the need to compen-
sate clearly injured plaintiffs and the goal of not unduly
burdening courts or defendants with frivolous claims.20 Although
the "parasitic recovery" rule carried the day for much of the
twentieth century, 2' it also received substantial criticism as an ar-
bitrary and overly restrictive limitation. 22 Presently, the rule has
been modified or replaced in almost all United States
jurisdictions.23
The primary modification to the physical impact/injury rule
has been the combined "zone of danger" and "physical manifes-
tation" rule.2 4 Although a plaintiff would not have to demon-
strate physical impact or injury under this newer model, he would
should have little difficulty concluding that such activities "do ... not need [and]
do . . . not merit protection." Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5, at 95.
19. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 179 (Mass. 1982).
20. Id. The Payton court recognized the difficult balance involved in "com-
pensating plaintiffs with clearly recognizable serious injuries, while not burden-
ing either the judicial system or individual defendants [with injuries that were]
... trivial, evanescent, feigned or imagined." Id.
21. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 323.
22. See, e.g., Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, Inc., 185 N.E. 860 (Ind. 1933)
(wife's recovery denied after witnessing car strike her husband); Blessington v.
Autry, 105 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1951) (denied recovery to mother who witnessed
child's fatal injury).
23. For a survey of jurisdictions which have abandoned the physical im-
pact/injury limitations, see Douglas Bryan Marlowe, Negligent Infliction of Mental
Distress: A Jurisdictional Survey of Existing Limitation Devices and Proposal Based on an
Analysis of Objective Versus Subjective Indices of Distress, 33 VILL. L. REV. 781, 802
n. 119 (1988) [hereinafter Marlowe, Jurisdictional Survey]. These jurisdictions in-
clude Alabama, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
Prior to this abrogation, exceptions to the physical impact requirement were
permitted where defendant's conduct could be shown to be extreme, intentional
or outrageous. Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 218 (Cal. 1970). The
rationale there was that the genuiness of the claim could also be insured by focus
on the nature of the defendant's act rather than on the consequences for plain-
tiff. See, e.g., Am. Rd. Serv. Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361 (Ala. 1980) (concerns
of fraudulent claim less where defendant's conduct reckless or intentional).
24. The first case to espouse this rule was Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W.
497 (Wis. 1935). In Waube, a mother looking out a window of her house to
watch her daughter cross the highway witnessed a negligent driver strike and kill
her daughter. Id. at 497. As a result of the fright and shock from witnessing this
horror, the mother herself died. Id. While not denying the severity of the shock
or the negligence of the driver, the Waube court nonetheless denied recovery for
the mother's death, reasoning that the defendant's duty extended only to those
within the zone of foreseeable physical injury. Id. at 500-01.
Of particular interest for the present discussion is the Waube court's ration-
6
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have to show that he had been in the zone of potential physical
harm from a tortious act and that the resulting emotional distress
was sufficiently serious to cause a physical manifestation of some
kind.25 Although the zone of danger/physical manifestation
model is presently favored in a substantial number of jurisdic-
tions, 26 it too has come under fire as an inexact identifier of meri-
torious claims. 27 Several jurisdictions have now replaced the
zone of danger requirement with a more direct assessment of the
foreseeability of emotional distress by adopting, in whole or in
part, the three-pronged foreseeability analysis set forth in the fa-
mous California case of Dillon v. Legg.28
In Dillon, although the plaintiff was not within the zone of
physical danger when she witnessed defendant's negligently
driven automobile strike and kill her infant daughter, recovery for
the mother's resulting emotional distress was permitted. 29 The
Dillon court disparaged the then prevailing view that no duty, and
thus no liability, extended to the witnesses of traumatic incidents.
ale for determining the zone of danger limitation. In this regard, the court
stated:
The answer to this question cannot be reached solely by logic, nor is it
clear that it can be entirely disposed of by a consideration of what the
defendant ought reasonably to have anticipated as a consequence of his
wrong. The answer must be reached by balancing the social interests involved in
order to ascertain how far defendant's duty and plaintiff's right may justly and
expediently be extended.
Id. at 501 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the claim that the unprece-
dented degree of toxicity inherent in modern industrial chemicals represents a
social interest justifying liability for both the physical and nervous upset caused
by their mishandling, see infra notes 146-177 and accompanying text.
Some combination of the zone of danger/physical manifestation require-
ment is still adhered to in the following jurisdictions: Arizona, Colorado, Dela-
ware, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Marlowe,Jurisdictional Survey, supra note 23, at 796-97 n.91.
25. Waube, 258 N.W. at 498. See also Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669
(1901) (liability supported where pregnant woman in zone of physical danger
was sent into labor prematurely due to shock when horse-drawn van crashed
through wall of her tavern).
26. For a list of jurisdictions which remain committed to the zone of dan-
ger/physical manifestation limitation, see supra note 24.
27. The physical manifestation requirement has been criticized as overin-
clusive because it would permit recovery even for insignificant emotional dis-
tress provided the plaintiff made only a token showing of some trivial physical
symptom. See James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109, 116 (Neb. 1985) (physical mani-
festation requirement criticized as both over and under-inclusive). The require-
ment has been viewed as underinclusive because otherwise substantial psychic
distress would have no remedy unless it happened to be accompanied by some
physical symptom. Id.
28. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
29. Id. at 914.
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"Duty" according to Dillon, "is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an
expression of the sum total of [policy] considerations.- 3 0 The Dil-
Ion court concluded that concerns of fraudulent claims and unlim-
ited liability could be sufficiently addressed through traditional
adversarial means.3 ' The Dillon court set aside the artificial physi-
cal injury/impact hurdles, and stated simply that "foreseeability
of the risk . . . will be the prime [focus] in every case."32
Perhaps to allay fears of unlimited liability and fraudulent
claims,33 however, the Dillon court chose not to leave the foresee-
ability determination entirely up to the discretion of subsequent
fact finders.3 4 Instead, the court established the following three
30. Id. at 918.
31. Id. As to the concern for fraudulent claims, the court rejected the argu-
ment that "[courts] should deny recovery upon a legitimate claim because other
fraudulent ones may be urged." Emphasizing that the fact finder is appropriate
barrier to false claims, the Dillon court stated:
Indubitably juries and trial courts, constantly called upon to distinguish
the frivolous from the substantial and the fraudulent from the meritori-
ous, reach some erroneous results. But such fallibility, inherent in the
judicial process, offers no reason for . . .an artificial and indefensible
barrier.
Id. Moreover, the Dillon court doubted that cases of this kind presented any
more pronounced problem of fraudulent claims than in other areas of torts. 441
P.2d 912, 918 (Cal. 1968).
32. Id. at 920. After dispelling the notion that concerns for fraudulent
claims or unlimited liability were any more acute in the present case than in
other contexts, the court stated:
In the absence of 'overriding policy considerations, foreseeability of
risk is of primary importance in establishing the element of duty.' As
the classic opinion states: 'The risk reasonably to be perceived defines
the duty to be obeyed.' Defendant owes a duty, in the sense of a poten-
tial liability for damages, only with respect to those risks or hazards
whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous, and
hence negligent, in the first instance.
Id. at 919-20 (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y.
1928) (citations omitted)). Although foreseeability became the cornerstone of
the duty analysis in Dillon, the court set down guidelines for determining fore-
seeability of injury in cases where the plaintiff was merely a witness to a trau-
matic incident. Id. at 920. For an enumeration of these guidelines and a
discussion of their relative utility or lack of utility, see infra notes 35-46 and
accompanying text.
33. See Stephen B. Presser & Jamil S. Zainaidin, LAW AND AMERICAN His-
TORY 821 (1980) (asserting guidelines used because Justice Tobriner sensed that
break from traditional limitations represented "difficult and uncertain . . .
undertaking").
34. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 919. The Dillon court struck a compromise between
what it considered the injustice of denying recovery for foreseeable distress
merely because the "zone of danger" requirement was not met and, on the other
hand, the specter of unlimited liability. Pure "foreseeability" analyses, without
factors, had traditionally been applied only in "direct duty" cases, where the
defendant's tortious acts had a direct effect on plaintiff. Id. at 916. The fear of
unlimited liability was naturally greater where recovery would be extended not
8
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factors to "aid" courts in the determination of foreseeability:35
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the
accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away
from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct
emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident, as con-
trasted with the learning of the accident from others af-
ter its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim
were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of
any relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship. 36
These now famous "Dillon factors" - 1) proximity, 2) con-
temporaneous observation, and 3) closeness of relation - initi-
ated a revolution in the recovery permitted in emotional distress
cases. Many jurisdictions adopted the Dillon foreseeability factors
nearly verbatim, while many more have indicated a willingness to
do so in a suitable case.3 7 This return to foreseeability as the cor-
nerstone of duty determinations represented a clear break from
nineteenth century protectionism. 38 The Dillon court recognized
the break with tradition its decision represented, but referred to
the former limitations as "an indefensible orthodoxy" to which
adherence could no longer be justified.3 9
only to the person maimed or killed, but also to onlookers. As a result of the
desire to limit the scope of potential bystander plaintiffs, the Dillon court sought
to limit recovery to family members present and observing the incident. Id. at
920.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Entex, Inc. v. McQuire, 414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982) (recovery avail-
able for nervous condition following gas explosion in plaintiff's presence which
destroyed home and injured wife; dicta that recovery available to bystander not
within zone of danger); Shelton v. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861
(Tenn. 1978) (father who learned of serious injuries to daughter after accident
failed to state cause of action; dicta that recovery available to close relative if
contemporaneous observation requirement were met). For a discussion of the
adoption of the Dillon criteria, see Marlowe,Jurisdictional Survey, supra note 23, at
806-07 n. 139. Jurisdictions accepting the Dillon criteria include: Florida, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Texas. Id.
38. For a discussion of the protectionism courts displayed towards corpo-
rate defendants in the nineteenth century, see supra notes 5-10 and accompany-
ing text.
39. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 925. Justifying its abandonment of the traditional
limitations in favor of its three-factored foreseeability analysis, the California
Supreme Court explained: "[t]o deny recovery would be to chain this state to an
outmoded rule of the 19th century which can claim no current credence. No
good reason compels our captivity to an indefensible orthodoxy." Id. Moreover,
1992]
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Although sound in theory, application of the Dillon factors
nonetheless yielded mixed results. 40 Some courts rejected the
factors entirely.41 Other courts adopted all three of them, but
placed disproportionate emphasis on one or another of them.42
Much like the traditional recovery limitations, the Dillon factors
were also criticized as both under- and over-inclusive, denying re-
covery for serious and foreseeable distress, while permitting re-
covery for mild stresses. 43 The California court itself, in Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospital,44 subsequently limited Dillon exclusively
the court stated, "the 19th century concept of a duty .. , '[that] a man is entitled
to be as negligent as he pleases towards the whole world if he owes no duty to
them,' has led courts to deny liability.... [T]his negation of duty emanates from
the twin fears . . . [of] (1) fraudulent and (2) indefinable claims . . . [neither of
which is] justified." Id. at 917.
The standard proposed by Dillon "contemplates that courts, on a case-by-
case basis, analyzing all the circumstances, will decide what the ordinary man
under such circumstances should reasonably have foreseen. The courts thus
mark out the areas of liability, excluding the remote and unexpected." Id. at 922.
40. See Marlowe, supra note 23, at 805-13.
41. Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1969), overruled by Wolfe v.
Sibley, 330 N.E.2d 603 (N.Y. 1975).
42. See, e.g.,James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109, 115 (1985) (relationship factor
most important); Oberreuter v. Orion Indus., 342 N.W.2d 492, 494 (Iowa 1984)
(proximity and contemporaneous observation most important to assure "hor-
ror" and "visceral participation").
43. See Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 17 (Cal. 1985) (Bird, J., con-
curring and dissenting) (mechanical application of Dillon factors has led to arbi-
trary and inequitable results antithetical to foreseeability principles enunciated
in Dillon).
One example of the harsh results possible within such a framework came in
Hathaway v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980). In Hathaway, a six-year-
old boy was electrocuted while playing outside by touching an evaporative
cooler. His parents who came outside when their son's playmate told them
something was wrong, found their son lying in a puddle of water by the cooler in
a "dying state," gagging and spitting up. Efforts to revive him failed. Id. at 437.
In upholding the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the emotional
distress claim, the Court of Appeals held that the parents' claim failed because it
did not satisfy the "contemporaneous observation" prong of Dillon. Although
the parents had observed their son gagging and dying, the court reasoned that
Dillon required that the parents have sensorily perceived the actual contact be-
tween the electrically charged water cooler and the child. Id. at 435. See also
Drew v. Drake, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (distress recovery denied
for failure to satisfy Dillon "closeness of relation" prong where plaintiff wit-
nessed death of her de facto husband in automobile collision). Compare Austin v.
Regents of University of California, 152 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1979) (permitted father
in delivery room to recover for emotional distress where he witnessed baby's
death due to defendant-hospital's negligence) with Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d
122 (Cal. 1977) (relief denied for failure to meet "contemporaneous observa-
tion" factor where father also in delivery room witnessed prolapse of umbilical
cord, anxiety of nurses trying to save baby, but learned of actual death of child
seconds later because view of child was blocked at moment of death).
44. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
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to "bystander" actions, 45 leaving a direct, non-factor-based fore-
seeability analysis for cases not involving a third-party
bystander. 46
. In Molien,47 the staff of a defendant-hospital mistakenly diag-
nosed plaintiff's wife as having syphilis and urged her to tell her
husband.48 As a result of the misdiagnosis, plaintiff's wife sus-
pected plaintiff of infidelity, and the resultant tension and hostil-
ity led to the break-up of their marriage. 49 Defendant argued that
application of the Dillon factors required denial of relief because
plaintiff-husband was not present when the doctors told Mrs.
Molien that she had syphilis, thus failing the contemporaneous
observation prong.50 Finding it foreseeable that a diagnosis of
syphilis would cause suspicion of infidelity and consequent mari-
tal discord and emotional distress, 5' however, the court rejected
defendant's argument that mere failure to satisfy each of the Dil-
lon factors barred recovery. The California court held Dillon to be
limited to those cases where plaintiff was a "percipient witness to
the injury of a third person," 52 and justified recovery for Mr.
Molien on the grounds of the foreseeability of his distress. Citing
the Dillon court's insistence that foreseeability must be adjudi-
cated on a case-by-case basis, the court noted that "no immutable
rule can establish the extent of [duty] for every circumstance." 5 3
With the holding in Molien, California had brought the
recoverability of emotional distress damages to parity with other
tort damages, with no physical injury requirement, no zone of
danger requirement and no surrogate foreseeability factors to ob-
fuscate the determination of a duty. Finally, at least in California,
a plaintiff could recover for foreseeable psychic harm without
45. Id. "Bystander" actions are those where the plaintiff's distress results
from concern for injury to another, rather than out of fear for one's own safety.
Id. Molien was not deemed a bystander action because, although the defendant-
physician's actions were directed at plaintiff's wife, the plaintiff's distress did not
result solely from concern for his wife's well-being, but also for his own well-
being and his marriage. Id. at 817. Additionally, defendants instructed plain-
tiff's wife to tell her husband that she had tested positive for venereal disease
and thereafter tested him for the disease. Id. at 814. As a result, the court rea-
soned, defendants' actions could be said to have been "directed at" the husband
as well as the wife. 616 P.2d at 817.
46. Id. at 815.
47. Id. at 813.
48. Id. at 814-15.
49. Id.
50. 616 P.2d at 815.
51. Id. at 817.
52. Id. at 816.
53. Id.
1992]
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having to meet arbitrary prerequisites of other harms or
contacts. 54
III. MASS TOXIN EXPOSURE: A UNIQUE TORT CALLING FOR A
UNIQUE REMEDY
Not all American jurisdictions have adopted the Molien ap-
proach to emotional distress foreseeability analyses. Courts have
been particularly reluctant to abandon emotional distress limita-
tions in toxic tort cases.5 5 This section will explore the unique
characteristics of toxins that make emotional distress without
54. Id. This rationale has been echoed by many of the courts who have
adopted the Molien approach. See, e.g., Hunsley v. Giard, 553 P.2d 1096 (Wash.
1976).
In Hunsley, for example, the Supreme Court of Washington concluded that
the boundaries of liability would be adequately limited by the traditional
method, that of limiting liability to foreseeable plaintiffs. Id. at 1103. In Hunsley,
plaintiff was sitting in her house when she heard a loud crash. Id. at 1097. She
rushed to the back porch utility room and discovered a Lincoln Continental in
the middle of the room. Id. Within an hour she began experiencing bodily
numbing sensations, and was later found to have suffered stress to the heart with
probable microscopic damage. Id. at 1097-98. Holding for the plaintiff, the
court stated:
[T]he application of the various rules, their exceptions and aberrations,
has led the courts to reach absurd results and created numerous artifi-
cial boundaries .... Rather than add to the already existing confusion
with the formulation of a new rule, we conclude that the wisest ap-
proach is to return to the traditional principles, theories and standards
of tort law. Thus we test the plaintiff's negligence claim against the
established concepts of duty, breach, proximate cause and damage or
injury.
Hunsley, 553 P.2d at 1102. Acknowledging the aversiveness of acts that cause
undue emotional suffering with or without concomitant physical injuries, several
jurisdictions have now adopted the direct foreseeability approach proposed in
Molien. See, e.g., Montinieri v. S. New England Tel. Co., 398 A.2d 1180 (Conn.
1978) (emotional harm foreseeable in hostage taking); Hoard v. Shawnee Mis-
sion Medical Ctr., 662 P.2d 1214 (Kan. 1983) (distress foreseeable where par-
ents mistakenly informed that child had died); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d
765 (Mo. 1983) (emotional distress foreseeable and thus compensable where
woman trapped in elevator due to defendant's negligence). For a list ofjurisdic-
tions adopting this rule, see Marlowe, Jurisdictional Survey, supra note 23, at 815
n.186 (listing Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri and
Washington).
55. Although Molien was decided in 1980, the first case to apply the
straightforward foreseeability analysis in a toxic tort case was decided in 1990.
See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1990), review
granted 806 P.2d 308 (Cal. 1991). For further discussion of Potter, see infra notes
125-139 and accompanying text.
Molien was also cited in the 1984 California Supreme Court case of Mitchell
v. Superior Court, 691 P.2d 642, 649 (Cal. 1984). The Mitchell court, however,
did not conduct a thorough analysis of the impact of Molien in the toxic tort
arena, as it dealt only with the narrow question of whether an attorney's commu-
nications with his client about the hazards of toxic waste were discoverable. Id. at
642. The Mitchell court cited Molien merely to support the claim that what plain-
12
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physical injury even more foreseeable in toxic tort cases than in
other areas.56 Section IV will survey the present and changing
caselaw regarding recovery for emotional distress in toxic tort
cases.57 Section V will discuss why permitting recovery for fore-
seeable emotional distress in this area will serve both social jus-
tice and social utility.58
A. Magnitude of the Problem
In addition to the emphasis on industrial growth rather than
safety during the Industrial Revolution,5 9 another reason that
courts of that era limited tort recovery was that the hazards them-
selves were relatively small, localized and predictable. 60 In con-
trast, modern industry involves dangers on a much grander scale.
Whereas dozens of people might have been killed in a typical
nineteenth century hazard, such as a train collision or a factory
fire, 6 1 these numbers pale by comparison to the thousands of
people that may be killed, maimed or lethally intoxicated in a sin-
gle modern-day toxic disaster. 62
tiff knew about the hazards of the toxin could serve to substantiate the "genui-
ness and reasonableness of her claim [for emotional distress]." Id. at 648-49.
56. For a general discussion of the unique aspects of toxic tort recovery in
the twentieth century, see Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5, at 86 (explain-
ing that absence of large scale technological risk during formation of common-
law makes it ill-suited to deal with problems presented by twentieth century
technology).
57. See infra notes 87-141 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 146-177 and accompanying text. See also, Allan Kanner,
Emerging Conceptions of Latent Personal Injuries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 18 RtrrG. L.J.
343 (1988) [hereinafter Kanner, Emerging Conceptions].
59. See Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5, at 86.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 86-87.
62. The Russian nuclear reactor accident at Chernobyl is predicted to result
in at least 5,000 to 20,000 deaths over the next fifty years. Nova: Suicide Mission to
Chernobyl (PBS television broadcast, October 22, 1991) (transcript on file at Villa-
nova Environmental Law Journal offices). Additionally, over 600,000 workers were
exposed to some radiation in the clean-up after the incident and the radioactive
debris from the explosion is estimated to have touched down on some three
billion people in the northern hemisphere. Id. at 5-6. At Bhopal, the leaking of
methyl isocyanate into the atmosphere killed 2000 people immediately and in-
jured 200,000 more. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp.
842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). In 1976, at Seveso, Italy release of only two kilograms
of dioxin fumigated a community of over 350,000 people. BEAT MEYER, INDOOR
AIR QUALITY 156 (1984).
Nor are these incidents limited to foreign lands. In 1985, in Kanawha Val-
ley, West Virginia, 150 people were injured when a Union Carbide plant re-
leased aldicarb oxime and dichloromethane into the atmosphere. Carl B. Meyer,
The Environmental Fate of Toxic Wastes, The Certainty of Harm, Toxic Torts, and Toxic
Regulation, 19 ENVTL. L. 321, 333 n.58 (1988) [hereinafter Meyer, Fate of Toxic
19921 125
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To the extent that our willingness to extend tort immunity to
hazardous industrial activities turns on a cost-benefit analysis, 63
the enormous number of casualties per incident, as well as the
increased frequency of such incidents, calls for a reappraisal of
our desire to shield the handlers of hazardous substances from
liability.64
B. Latency and Uncertainty
Damages from nineteenth century industrial accidents were
typically immediate and discernible.65 After a fire, collision or
poisoning, a party typically knew what his losses were and could
turn his attention to dealing with it, medically, psychologically or
otherwise. In the legal arena, this knowledge and certainty of
damages allowed a party to easily sue for compensation. 66 This is
rarely the case in modern toxin cases. 67
Injuries from modern toxin cases may involve years of expo-
sure, before awareness of exposure and often several more years
before the physical damage emerges. 68 This latency problem
Wastes]. At Times Beach, Missouri, over 2,200 people were required to evacuate
their town after a waste-cite owner, attempting to dissipate a leaking pit of 17
tons of dioxin waste, negligently hired a sub-contractor who disposed of the
waste by spraying it on the public roads. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeast-
ern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, Mis-
souri v. Continental Ins. Co., 488 U.S. 821 (1988).
63. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
In Carroll Towing, Judge Hand articulated the now well-known "Learned Hand
formula" for determining whether liability will attach to a certain activity. Id. at
173. Using an algebraic model, Judge Hand proposed: "if the probability be
called P; the injury L; and the burden [of imposing liability] B; liability depends
upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P, i.e., whether B < PL." Id.
64. In terms of the Learned Hand formula, this increase in injury per acci-
dent would be represented by a larger "L" value. Id. at 173. The increased
frequency of environmental hazards would be represented by a larger "P"' value.
Id. Thus, the product of multiplying "P" times "L" would be proportionately
greater compared to "B," thereby strengthening the argument for ascribing lia-
bility to these activities. Id.
65. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5, at 86.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. The paradigmatic case of the latency of the pathogenic effects of expo-
sure is that of asbestos exposure. BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND
LEGAL ASPECTS (3d ed. 1984). Asbestos was commonly inhaled by naval ship-
yard workers who used asbestos-laden materials to insulate pipe-fittings. Id.
Such exposure commonly occurred for 20-30 years, all while the workers, but
not the manufacturers of asbestos, were completely naive as to the hazards in-
volved. See id. at 266-67. Only ten or twenty years hence, a worker may learn
that asbestos causes deadly respiratory dysfunction and even cancer in a high
percentage of those exposed. Whether it would happen to him, however,
although probable, would not be known for certain for another 10-40 years. Id.
14
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presents a formidable challenge to the traditional common-law
tort framework, which permits recovery only upon a showing of
current, legally cognizable injury.69 Several creative attempts at
solving this dilemma, including actions for the increased risk it-
self" and claims for the costs of medical monitoring, 7' have been
attempted, but have proven to be less than perfect solutions. 72
An intellectually honest approach, as well the approach move
consistent with the tradition of compensating plaintiffs for pres-
ently cognizable injuries, 73 would be to compensate the victims of
negligent management of toxic waste for the serious emotional
distress they reasonably suffer, whether or not physical injury has
The required exposure and typical progression, as described by Castleman, is as
follows:
[T]he disease process would not become evident for the first few years
of exposure no matter how intense the exposure was. Yet slowly but
surely, the lung scarring would develop as the mineral fibers accumu-
lated in the lungs and had time to provoke the characteristic response.
Moreover, by the time the disease became evident, cessation of expo-
sure could not halt the inexorable progress of the disease caused by the
durable fibers already trapped in the lung tissues .... [Elven a moder-
ate degree of asbestosis [is] a threat to life, because of the enhanced
risk that an ordinary chest cold could lead to pneumonia and death.
CASTLEMAN, supra at 33.
69. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 412 (5th Cir.
1986).
70. Kanner, Emerging Conceptions, supra note 58, at 359-60. Although per-
mitting recovery for increased risk of disease was initially considered a promis-
ing solution, see, e.g., Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984) (relief granted
where permanent skull fracture from motorcycle accident created risk of future
infection and meningitis), this theory of liability has since fallen into relative
obscurity. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Co., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988)
(increased risk not compensable unless medically reasonably certain to occur
but fear of increased risk, if reasonable, is compensable); Ayers v. Twp. of Jack-
son, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987) (denied claim for increased risk but permitted
claim for costs of medical monitoring). See also Dev. in the Law - Toxic Waste
Litig., 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1624 (1986).
71. So called "medical monitoring" claims have proven much more suc-
cessful than claims for increased risk and are now standard pleadings in toxic
tort cases. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, General Electric Co. v. Knight, 111 S.Ct. 1584 (1991); Ayers v.
Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987); Burns v.Jaquays Mining Corp., 752
P.2d 28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). See generally Allan T. Slagel, Medical Surveillance
Damages: A Solution to the Inadequate Compensation of Toxic Tort Victims, 63 IND. L.J.
849 (1988).
72. Paying for the costs of medical checkups, for example, does not even
purport to compensate plaintiffs for the mental anguish involved in awaiting the
diagnosis of cancer. See Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d at 850 (distin-
guishing recovery for emotional distress from that for increased risk and medical
monitoring).
73. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 412 (5th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
15
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yet to appear.7 4
This may actually be the only tenable approach in a field
frought with latency and scientific uncertainty for compensating
victims of incursions on their sense of safety.75 Since lawyers can-
not prove in the courtroom what scientists have yet to prove in
the laboratory, scientific uncertainty about the dangers of a toxin
has traditionally worked against plaintiffs trying to prove injury
from exposure. 76 Under the traditional rules, the scientific uncer-
tainty made it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove causation and
they have been left in the peculiar position of having to "earn"
recovery for their current emotional distress by subsequently be-
coming physically ill. 7 7
The implications of this state of affairs was recently made evi-
dent in the discovery, in Chester, Pennsylvania, that radioactive
sand had been mixed into cement that had been used to build
several occupied homes. 78 Homes ordered to be evacuated by
74. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1988) (recogniz-
ing legally protected interest in mental quietude); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d
509 (Haw. 1970). For a compendium of studies attesting to the degree of psy-
chological disturbance that may occur due to toxin exposure, see CHERYL
BROWN TRAVIS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ToxINS: PSYCHOLOGICAL, BEHAVIORAL
AND SOCIOCULTURAL ASPECTS, 1973-1989 (1989) (accumulating summaries of
over 900 articles and studies on the psychological aftermath of toxin exposure).
75. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5, at 87, 122-28.
76. Id. As Professor Robert Bohrer points out, the effect of the magnitude
of modern hazards, the inherent uncertainty in their effect and the latency of
their manifestations:
[t]aken together...., place tremendous burdens on the traditional com-
mon law framework.... Any demand for.., relief.., faces monumen-
tal problems with respect to proof of causation. To prove that a given
leukemia victim's disease was caused twenty or more years before by a
particular exposure to a substance which causes leukemia in only five
cases out of 10,000, and to discount any other cause or exposure, is a
crushing burden for the victim-plaintiff.
Id. at 87.
Professor Bohrer argues that forcing plaintiffs to delay suit until physical
disease processes begin works an unjust deprivation of redress for real suffering.
Moreover, because of the difficulty of proving causation, that deprivation may
never be redressed. Id. at 88.
77. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Co., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (causal
link between exposure and injuries must be proven to reasonable medical cer-
tainty based on theories which have found acceptance in the scientific
community).
78. Nathan Gorenstein et al., 5 Homes in Borough Contaminated, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Nov. 24, 1991 [hereinafter Gorenstein, 5 Homes Contaminated] From
1915 to 1922, a radium processing plant in a nearby community produced the
sand as a by-product and the material was used to make cement, stucco and
plaster. Cynthia J. McGroarty & Nathan Gorenstein, EPA Broadens Search for Ra-
diation in Area Buildings, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov. 23, 1991 [hereinafter Mc-
Groarty & Gorenstein, EPA Broadens Search].
16
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the Environmental Protection Agency carried radiation levels as
much as twenty-three times above the recommended standards
for residences. 79 One of the several evacuated families had been
exposed to radiation in their home for over eighteen years.80
Although the ultimate resolution led to a conclusion that only a
limited number of families were in danger, the discovery caused
fear and shock to persons who had developed absolutely no phys-
ical symptoms. Moreover, such emotional reactions were suffered
by those who could not even be sure that they had been exposed
at all. 8 ' It became clear that the negligent disposal of the radioac-
tive waste caused cognizable emotional distress, even to those
who could not prove exposure.8 2
As noted by many prominent commentators, courts and reg-
ulatory agencies have been needlessly "paralyzed by insufficient
data and irreducible uncertainty."8 3 This paralysis could be rem-
edied by viewing uncertainty itself, and the attendant emotional
angst, as a cost itself in the balancing of social interests. 8 4 "By
accepting uncertainty about safety as an outcome with cognizable
consequences [e.g. emotional distress]," Professor Robert Bohrer
argues that "the legal system may anticipate and deter unjustifi-
able risks without waiting until the technological crisis is no
longer soluble."8 5 As will be seen below, courts have only re-
cently begun to appreciate this perspective.86
79. Although thousands of tons of the material was generated and
thousands of homes were being searched by a single mobile radiation van, only
four homes were evacuated. Gorenstein, 5 Homes Contaminated, supra note 78.
80. McGroarty & Gorenstein, EPA Broadens Search, supra note 78. One ex-
pert estimated that exposure levels found could cause a person's cancer risk to
jump to one in 20 after 50 years of exposure. Gorenstein, 5 homes contaminated,
supra note 78. Although the most radioactive house found had only been occu-
pied by its residents for the previous 18 years, many more long-standing resi-
dents could not be sure that they were not exposed. Id.
81. McGroarty & Gorenstein, EPA Broadens Search, supra note 78. One per-
son living a block from the radiation plant noted that her grandfather had lived
in a badly contaminated home and had died of cancer. Her father died of leuke-
mia. Even though not knowing for sure whether she had herself been exposed,
the woman was anxious about the health effects from which she may have al-
ready been suffering. Gorenstein, 5 Homes Contaminated, supra note 78.
82. Although the Chester incident has not yet involved lawsuits of any kind,
it is used merely as an illustration of the myriad of ways in which real, justifiable
emotional distress may arise due to mishandling of hazardous substances even
in the absence of physical harm or even proof of exposure.
83. See, e.g., Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5, at 83.
84. Id. at 123.
85. Id. at 83.
86. See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 885
(1990), review granted, 806 P.2d 308 (Cal. 1991) (granted recovery in toxic tort
19921
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IV. MODIFICATIONS IN THE TREATMENT OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
DAMAGES IN Toxic TORT CASES
The last ten years of toxic tort litigation have been influenced
by the general trend in tort law to deemphasize the physical im-
pact/injury requirement. As described in the section below, how-
ever, this liberalization has occurred much slower in the toxic tort
context than in the tort arena at large.8 7
A. Adherence to the Old Order: Payton v. Abbott Labs
In the 1982 case of Payton v. Abbott Labs,8 8 plaintiffs' mother
had ingested diethylstilbestrol (DES) during pregnancy. 89 In re-
viewing the daughters' claims for fear of future cancer and repro-
ductive organ abnormalities as a result of exposure while in the
mother's womb, the court held that recovery for such distress as a
"reasonable person" would have suffered was proper, but only
after showings of negligence, causation and physical harm.90 The
Payton court exhibited the traditional disdain for emotional dis-
tress damages, concluding that:
[W]hen recovery is sought for negligent.., infliction of
emotional distress, evidence must be introduced that the
plaintiff has suffered physical harm .... This require-
ment . . . will serve to limit frivolous suits and those in
which only bad manners or hurt feelings are
involved .... 91
Even though the California Supreme Court had already de-
cided Molien, articulating a straightforward foreseeability analysis,
courts in other jurisdictions dealing with emotional distress dam-
case for emotional distress deemed foreseeable under direct foreseeability test
of Molien).
87. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal.
1952) (first American case to allow recovery for emotional distress without con-
comitant showing of physical harm).
88. 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
89. Id. at 173. DES was used widely from the mid-1940s to 1970 in the
United States to prevent miscarriages. MARY 0. AMDUR ET AL., CASARETT AND
DoULL's TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 229 (4th ed. 1991) [here-
inafter AMDUR, SCIENCE OF POISINS]. Beginning in the mid-1960s a correlation
began to appear between vaginal and cervical abnormalities, including cancer,
and women who had been exposed to DES in utero. Although the absolute risk
for developing vaginal or cervical cancer was low (1.4 chances in 1,000 through
age 24), approximately 75 percent of DES-exposed females developed some
form of vaginal abnormality. Id.
90. 437 N.E.2d at 181 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 180.
18
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ages in toxic tort cases ignored its reasoning.92 In Peterman v.
Techalloy Co., 93 for example, plaintiffs had ingested well water pol-
luted with trichloroethylene, a highly toxic substance. 94 Dis-
missing the claim for emotional distress, the court adhered to
traditional limitations, finding recovery permissible in only three
narrowly circumscribed situations. As stated by the court, those
situations included: 1) where the distress is the result of an actual
physical injury; 2) where plaintiff witnesses a violent and trauma-
tizing event, such as an accident endangering a close relative; or
3) where plaintiff suffers physical injuries as a result of emotional
distress caused by the tortfeasor's threat to plaintiff's physical
well-being and is accompanied by some form of physical impact. 95
B. Winds of Change: Trivializing the Physical Injury
Requirement
In Anderson v. W. R. Grace & Co. ,96 twenty-five plaintiffs alleged
that they were exposed to trichloroethylene and te-
trachloroethylene through the use of contaminated ground water
from their wells, causing them to suffer a variety of illnesses. 97
Recovery was sought also for emotional distress relating to their
increased risk of leukemia and other cancers caused to their im-
mune systems. 98 Defendant argued that the emotional distress of
those plaintiffs who had not yet contracted leukemia was not com-
pensable because they lacked the requisite showing of physical in-
jury.99 Taking a less stringent view of what constitutes physical
92. See, e.g., Amendola v. K.C. Southern Ry., 699 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D. Mo.
1988) (following Payton reasoning in denial of recovery for emotional distress
related to asbestos exposure).
93. 29 Pa. D&C.3d 104 (1982).
94. Trichloroethylene (TCE) is used in large quantities for degreasing
fabricated metal parts, dry-cleaning of fabrics and as a solvent for a variety of
other purposes. It has been found to cause lung and kidney cancer in mice,
although whether these effects generalize t6 humans is still under investigation.
AMDUR, SCIENCE OF POISINS, supra note 89, at 887.
95. Peterman, 29 Pa. D&C.3d at 109 (emphasis added). Although Peterman
was a case decided by a Pennsylvania county court, its views characterize those of
most courts considering emotional distress claims in toxic tort litigation in the
early 1980's. See, e.g., Nutt v. A.C. & S., Inc., 466 A.2d 18 (Del. Super. 1983),
aff'd Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647 (Del. 1984); Cathcart
v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 471 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super. 1984); Laxton v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982); but see DiGiovanni v. Latimer,
454 N.E.2d 483 (Mass. 1983) (Liacos, J. concurring) (criticizing Payton).
96. 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D.C. Mass. 1986).
97. Id. at 1222.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1226.
19921
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injury, however, the court rejected defendant's assertion, holding
that harm to the immune system, with or without subsequent ill-
ness, satisfied the physical injury requirement for purposes of an
emotional distress claim.' 00
The physical injury/impact requirement was virtually re-
duced to a triviality in the late 1980's in several cases permitting
emotional distress recovery upon a mere showing that the plain-
tiffs had been exposed to a toxin, even in the absence of a show-
ing of any physical effects whatsoever.' 0 ' In Hagerty v. L & L
Marine,10 2 a seaman loading a barge was drenched with a highly
toxic chemical due to a breakdown in the barge loading equip-
ment. 10 3 In a later mishap, he was again sprayed with the same
chemical.' 0 4 In reviewing his claim for mental anguish due to his
fear of developing cancer, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
current absence of any evidence of cancer did not bar plaintiff's
claim for "cancerphobia,"' 0 5 as the fear was nonetheless reason-
able and causally related to the defendant's negligence in ensur-
ing the integrity of the barge loading equipment. 0 6
Rejecting the defendant's argument that only a physical in-
jury requirement would insure against unworthy claims, the Hag-
erty court concluded that courts have better devices with which to
choose between worthy and unworthy claims, stating:
The physical injury requirement, like its counter-
100. Id. Citing Payton, defendants had argued that plaintiff's emotional dis-
tress claim should have been barred because plaintiff's alleged physical harm
was merely "subcellular," thus not meeting the physical harm requirement. 628
F. Supp. at 1226. The court rejected this argument, emphasizing that the impor-
tant factor was the medical verifiability of the harm, not the gross or subtle na-
ture of it. Even under Payton, concluded the court, as long as the harm could be
"substantiated by expert medical testimony," it would be sufficient to support a
claim for related emotional distress. Id. at 1227. See also Barth v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 661 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (immune system injury satis-
fies physical injury requirement).
101. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Co., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988)
(mere ingestion satisfied physical injury requirement); Ayers v. Twp. ofJackson,
525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987). See also Destories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705,
710 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing trend of cases holding that physical injury
requirement satisfied by mere ingestion of contaminated water).
102. 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986).
103. Id. at 317.
104. Id.
105. "Cancerphobia" is merely a term describing a specific type of mental
anguish, that is, the fear of developing cancer. See FournierJ. Gayle & James L.
Goyer III, Recovery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of Cancer, 15 CUMB. L. REV.
723, 725 (1985).
106. Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 318-19.
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part, the physical impact requirement, was developed to
provide courts with an objective means of ensuring that
the alleged mental injury is not feigned. We believe that
notion to be unrealistic. It is doubtful that the trier of
fact is any less able to decide the fact or extent of mental
suffering in the event of physical injury or impact. With
or without physical injury or impact, a plaintiff is entitled
to recover damages for serious mental distress arising
from fear of developing cancer where his fear is reason-
able and causally related to the defendant's
negligence. 107
Similarly, in Ayers v. Township ofJackson, t0 8 three-hundred and
thirty-nine municipal residents brought suit against the township
for its negligent operation of a landfill.' 0 9 Through noncompli-
ance with various permit requirements, the township permitted
highly toxic chemicals to leach into local water supplies." 0 The
toxic effects of these chemicals released were known to include
liver and kidney damage, mutations in genetic material and dam-
age to blood and reproductive systems."' Although residents
were eventually warned not to use the water and the township
eventually provided alternative sources, this occurred only after
up to six years of consumption of the poisonous water." 2
The jury returned an aggregate verdict for emotional distress
of $2,056,480, with individual awards ranging from $40 to
$14,000. On appeal, the township argued that proof of related
physical symptoms was a prerequisite to recovery for emotional
distress."i 3 The New Jersey Supreme Court explicitly rejected
this argument, stating that "mental and emotional distress is just
107. Id. at 318. The court concluded that the surrounding circumstances
provided more than adequate indicia of the genuineness of the emotional dis-
tress. Id. at 318-19. The plaintiff testified that he had studied the effects of the
chemicals he dealt with and thus knew before the exposure that dripolene was
carcinogenic. Id. Moreover, having previously watched benzene absorb into his
fingers, he suffered substantial anxiety because now his entire body had ab-
sorbed the chemical. The plaintiff also testified that a doctor had advised him to
obtain periodic medical examinations for cancer and that he had left his job on
the docks out of concern for future accidents. Id. at 319.
108. 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
109. Id. at 291.
110. Id. Four of the twelve chemicals in the water were well-known carcino-
gens. Id. at 292.
111. Id.
112. 525 A.2d at 292-93.
113. 525 A.2d at 295.
1992]
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as 'real' as physical pain," ' 1 4 and that New Jersey "no longer re-
quire[s] proof of causally-related physical impact to sustain a re-
covery for emotional distress."' 15 According to the Ayers court, it
was enough that "anxiety, stress, fear, and depression .. .were
directly and causally related to the knowledge that [plaintiffs] had
ingested and been exposed to contaminated water for a substan-
tial time period."" 16
In Sterling v. Velsicol, 117 a chemical corporation deposited over
300,000 containers of ultrahazardous chemical waste in a landfill
without conducting preliminary studies to determine the soil
composition or the effect the landfill would have on local resi-
dents' water supply."18 Knowing of the landfill, but relying on
reports that it had not affected the water supply, area residents
ingested the contaminated water for a period of several years
prior to being informed that their water was actually contami-
nated." 9 The United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Tennessee allowed recoveries for emotional distress
damages ranging from $50,000 to $250,000.120
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit concluded that, although dam-
ages for mental distress are not recoverable where the connection
between the anxiety and the existing injury is either too "remote
114. Id. at 297 (quoting Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (N.J. 1979)).
115. Id. at 295. Recovery for the emotional distress damages were none-
theless denied because such a claim was barred against a municipality under the
New Jersey Tort Claims Act. Id. The New Jersey Tort Claims Act precludes tort
recovery for "pain and suffering" from local governments. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 59:1-2 (West 1982).
116. 525 A.2d at 295. Although precluded from imposing liability on the
defendant municipality due to statutory immunity, see supra note 115, the New
Jersey Supreme Court discussed at length the difficulties courts have in applying
common-law principles to the toxic tort context, concluding:
[C]ourts have struggled to accommodate common-law tort doctrines to
the peculiar characteristics of toxic tort litigation. The overwhelming
conclusion of the commentators who have evaluated the result is that
the accommodation has failed, that common-law tort doctrines are ill-
suited to the resolution of such injury claims.
Id. at 299.
117. 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
118. Id. at 1192.
119. Id. at 1192-93. Even after the United States Geological Survey (USGS)
expressed concern to Velsicol over risk to the local water sources, Velsicol con-
tinued to expand its disposal operation. Such disposals continued until the state
ordered that Velsicol cease its landfill operations. Id. at 1193. Three years after
the closing of the site, the USGS discovered that local aquifer had in fact become
highly contaminated and users of all wells within 1,000 acres of the landfill were
advised to stop using them. Id.
120. 855 F.2d at 1194.
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or tenuous,"''2 it was deemed sufficient for emotional distress re-
covery that "[e]ach plaintiff.., personally suffered from a reason-
able fear of contracting cancer . . .as a result of ingesting Velsicol's
chemicals." 122
121. Id. at 1206.
122. Id. (emphasis added). Although the Velsicol court sustained the lower
court's awarding of damages for emotional distress, it characterized the amount
of damages awarded as excessive, and reduced them to amounts proportional to
the amount of time of alleged exposure. Id. at 1207.
The court's reasoning in the damage reduction analysis is highly suspect.
The court relied on the earlier Tennessee decision in Laxton v. Orkin Extermi-
nating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982), for the proposition that damage
awards for emotional distress should be limited to only that period of time that
the plaintiff could entertain reasonable fear. 855 F.2d at 1207.
In Laxton, plaintiff's family had been informed that they had been drinking
water contaminated with chlordane, which the plaintiff knew to be highly toxic.
639 S.W.2d at 432. Plaintiff was extremely disturbed about the potential health
consequences for herself and her family. She was relieved of this distress only
eight months later, when her physician determined that the exposure was insuffi-
cient to cause harm. Id. at 433. The Laxton court reasoned that plaintiff could
have entertained reasonable and thus compensable distress only up until the
time at which her physician dispelled her fears. Id. at 434. Accordingly, for the
eight months of "reasonable" fear, each plaintiff was awarded $6,000. Id. at
431.
Reasoning that the Laxton approach of awarding recovery only for the pe-
riod of reasonable distress was a worthy one, the Velsicol court proceeded to cal-
culate what it deemed appropriate damages for the plaintiff based on the
"annual rate" of $9,000 per year of suffering that the Laxton award represented.
855 F.2d 1207. Thus stated the Sixth Circuit, "[ulsing Laxton as a guidepost, we
... vacate the district court's award and award each of the five representative
plaintiffs damages based upon the duration of their exposure to the contami-
nated water." Id. Accordingly, "[pilaintiff Johnson, who was exposed to the
chemicals for a period of approximately two years, is awarded $18,000 versus
the district court's award of $250,000; . . . plaintiff Wilbanks, who was exposed
for approximately six years, is awarded $54,000 versus the district court's award
of $100,000." Id.
The Sixth Circuit's reliance on the Laxton damage award to prorate damages
for the plaintiffs in Velsicol does not hold up under even casual scrutiny. First of
all, the use of an award in one case as a proportional basis for damages in an-
other presumes identical facts, or at least identical injury. The court, however,
presented nothing to support the equality of the emotional distress in Laxton
with that in Velsicol; quite to the contrary, the district court, as fact finder, had
obviously deemed the injury much more severe. 855 F.2d at 1202. Secondly,
although the court may have approved of the Laxton method of limiting emo-
tional distress to that period prior to the dispelling of the plaintiffs' fears by their
physician, no such dispelling of fears was reported in the facts of Velsicol. Id. at
1192-94. Failing to acknowledge this distinction, the Velsicol court instead pro-
rated the award according to the plaintiffs' time of exposure to the chemical, even
though the alleged emotional distress persisted beyond the end of the exposure.
Id. at 1207. In most cases, in fact, the emotional distress did not begin until
some time after the exposure ceased, when plaintiffs' were first told of the water's
toxicity. Id. at 1192-94.
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C. Reasonable Fear of Cancer Justifiable Even Where High
Risk Cannot be Proven
The Sterling court noted that an emotional distress claim
could survive even when it cannot be established that it is more
likely than not that the feared disease will actually materialize.' 23
In this regard, the court stated:
While there must be a reasonable connection between
the injured plaintiff's mental anguish and the prediction
of future disease, the central focus of a court's inquiry is
not on the underlying odds that the future disease will in
fact materialize. To this extent, mental anguish resulting
from the chance ... of a future disease [is compensable]
even though the underlying future prospect for suscepti-
bility to a future disease is not . . . compensable inas-
much as it is not sufficiently likely to occur.' 2 4
123. Velsicol, 855 F.2d 1188.
124. 855 F.2d at 1206 (emphasis added). Although emotional distress
damages were awarded in Velsicol, the court's treatment of plaintiffs' claims that
they suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) represented an un-.
precedented and unjustifiable extension into the field of psychiatry. PTSD is a
psychiatric disorder that may develop after exposure to a psychologically trau-
matic event "generally outside of the range of usual human experience." Ameri-
can Psychiatric Assoc., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 236 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III]. For an in-depth discussion
of the role of PTSD in toxic exposure cases, see Esther A. Berezofsky, Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder and the Technological Disaster, 18 RuTG. L.J. 623 (1987), re-
printed in 2 Tox. L. REP. 301 (Aug. 12, 1987).
According to the version of psychiatric criteria in effect at the time of the
Velsicol trial, PTSD was to be diagnosed where the four following criteria were
satisfied:
A. Existence of a recognizable stressor that would evoke significant
symptoms of distress in almost everyone.
B. Reexperiencing of the trauma as evidenced by at least one of the
following:
(1) recurrent and intrusive recollections of the event.
(2) recurrent dreams of the event
(3) sudden acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were reoccur-
ring, because of an association with an environmental or ideational
stimulus.
C. Numbing or responsiveness to or reduced involvement with the
external world, beginning some time after the trauma, as shown by at
least one of the following:
(1) markedly diminished interest in one or more significant
activities
(2) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others
(3) constricted affect
D. At least two of the following symptoms that were not present
before the trauma:
(1) hyperalertness or exaggerated startle response
(2) sleep disturbance
24
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This sentiment was reinforced in the recent California case of
Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. 125 Potter involved the familiar
scenario of disposal of known carcinogens at a waste-site not
suited to hold such chemicals. 126 Plaintiffs discovered that their
domestic water wells had been contaminated with several toxins
from the landfill, including the known carcinogens benzene and
vinyl chloride.' 27 Upholding the trial court's award for plaintiffs'
fear of contracting cancer, the California District Court of Ap-
peals echoed the view of the Sixth Circuit in Sterling regarding the
distinction between actual chance of cancer and the reasonable
fear thereof. In this regard, the court stated:
The fear of cancer damages were awarded for respon-
dents'fear that they will develop the disease, not for the
(3) guilt about surviving when others have not, or about behavior
required for survival
(4) memory impairment or trouble concentrating
(5) avoidance of activities that arouse recollection of the traumatic
event
(6) intensification of symptoms by exposure to events that symbol-
ize or resemble the traumatic event.
DSM-III, supra, at 238.
The Velsicol court, in reversing the trial court's finding that plaintiffs suffered
from PTSD, stated:
[P]laintiffs' drinking or otherwise using contaminated water, even over
an extended period of time, does not constitute the type of recogniza-
ble stressor identified either by professional medical organizations or
courts. Examples of stressors upon which courts have based awards for
PTSD include rape, assault, military combat, fires, floods, earthquakes,
car and airplane crashes, torture, and even internment in concentration
camps .... Whereas consumption of contaminated water may be an
unnerving occurrence, it does not rise to the level of the type of psy-
chologically traumatic event that is a universal stressor.
855 F.2d at 1210.
The standard for overturning on appeal a trial court's finding of fact is that
the trial court's findings were "clearly erroneous." Anderson v. City of Besse-
mer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). It is clear in Velsicol, however, that the Sixth
Circuit merely substituted its judgment of what constitutes a "recognizable
stressor." In so doing the Sixth Circuit attempted to decide as a matter of law
the scope of what is a psychiatric, not a legal, term of art. See DSM-III, supra, at
12 (cautioning that purpose of DSM-III is to enable only trained "clinicians and
investigators" to diagnose).
125. 274 Cal. Rptr. 885 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), cert. granted, 806 P.2d 308
(1991).
126. Id. at 887. Respondent had been warned not to send these chemicals
to the site and for a period complied with the request. When waste production
exceeded expected levels, however, and alternative disposal proved too expen-
sive, a cost-conscious manager directed that disposal at the site resume. Id.
127. Id. at 888. Exposure to benzene has long been known to cause leuke-
mia. AMDUR, SCIENCE OF POISINS, supra note 89, at 191-92. Vinyl chloride has
been strongly implicated in the production of liver cancer. Its role in exacerbat-
ing the risk of lung cancer, although suspected, is still uncertain. Id.
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chance that they will .... Respondents fear cancer now.
Their fear is certain, definite and real .... [W]e con-
clude that a plaintiff need not establish that cancer is rea-
sonably certain to occur in order to recover for fear of
cancer. 1
2 8
D. Molien Revisited: Direct Foreseeability Analysis Applied to
Emotional Distress Damages in the Toxic Tort Arena
In addition to validating the distinction between the chances
of cancer and the reasonable fear thereof, the seminal impact of
the Potter decision, and its appeal, is the application of the Molien
foreseeability analysis in the toxic tort context.' 29 In Potter, re-
spondents had argued that even a showing of increased risk of
developing cancer would not constitute the physical injury neces-
sary to support recovery for emotional distress. 130 Plaintiffs
countered that, under Molien, it made no difference whether a
physical injury could be shown.' 3 ' Recognizing that "Molien es-
tablished that a plaintiff could recover for ... [emotional distress]
even in the absence of physical injury, the Potter court also agreed
that 'the circumstances of the case, expert ... testimony, and the
jurors' own experience could provide sufficient guarantees of
genuiness to corroborate a claim of emotional distress.' "132
V. ANALYSIS
The Potter court's application of Molien in the toxic tort arena
represents the culmination of a decade of change in this area.
During this time, courts have gradually deserted the anachronistic
physical injury/impact requirements and have focused more di-
rectly on the foreseeability of the emotional harm suffered by the
plaintiff.' 33 Molien's explicit requirement of "foreseeably elicited
serious emotional distress"' 3 4 eliminates the role of the arbitrary
injury requirements and permits fact-finders to judge foreseeabil-
ity directly from all the circumstances, not just those dictated by
128. Potter, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 891-92 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 890. For a discussion of an earlier case that cited Molien tangen-
tially in a toxic tort context, see supra note 55.
130. Potter, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 890.
133. See, e.g., Sterling, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Hagerty, 788 F.2d 315
(5th Cir. 1986); Ayers, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
134. Molien, 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980).
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certain constricting "factors."' 3 5 If the application of Molien in
this area is upheld by the California Supreme Court in its review
of Potter, i36 a welcome death knell may be sounded for the physi-
cal injury requirement in toxic tort cases.
Although Sterling, Potter, and Hagerty clearly support recovery
for emotional distress without a showing of physical manifesta-
tions of the distress, those decisions may conceivably be read as
adhering to the old physical "impact" rule, since exposure was
alleged in each case. 13 7 However, proper application of Molien
would not require a showing of actual physical impact. Molien, af-
ter all, involved no physical impact whatsoever, but merely the
communication of information, albeit false, that plaintiff's wife
had contracted syphilis.' 38 Moreover, the Molien court explicitly
stated that "legal protection should extend to emotional
tranquility." 13 9
This rule is particularly important in the toxic tort arena due
to the uncertainty involved in proving exposure. In many cases,
an entire class of plaintiffs may entertain serious and reasonable
distress about exposure to a lethal toxin even though they will not
be certain that they have been exposed for years. Adoption of a
pure Molien analysis in such cases would permit recovery not only
for the traditional plaintiff, who can definitively prove exposure,
but also for the plaintiff who, because of the nature of the circum-
stances or the relative infancy of the relevant science, can estab-
lish only a probability that exposure has occurred.140 This model
135. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (determin-
ing foreseeability through application of explicitly enumerated factors).
136. 274 Cal. Rptr. 885 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), cert. granted, 806 P.2d 308
(1991).
137. See, e.g., Potter, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 894 ("our holding is limited to these
particular circumstances, where the plaintiffs have ingested carcinogens."); Ster-
ling, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (all plaintiffs had ingested contaminated
water); ltagerty, 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986) (drenching with liquid deemed to
satisfy physical impact requirement).
138. Molien, 616 P.2d 813, 814 (Cal. 1980).
139. Id. at 817 (cited in Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 122 Cal.
Rptr. 470, 482 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)).
140. At Love Canal, for example, it was suspected that substantial quanti-
ties of dioxin had been present when it was learned that 200 tons of a related
chemical, TCP, appeared on the list of chemicals buried at the site. Dioxin is
considered one of the most toxic man-made compounds. It was common-knowl-
edge in the scientific community at the time that "if three ounces were evenly
distributed and subsequently ingested among a million people . . .all of them
would die." Brown, Poisoning of America, supra note 2, at 46. Nonetheless, even
after two years of investigation, the New York Department of Health concluded
that "it is impossible to determine whether [dioxin] represents the major toxic
hazard at Love Canal." DAVID AXELROD, LOVE CANAL: A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE
1992]
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would theoretically permit recovery whenever the overall chance
of disease, is sufficiently great to justify reasonable distress.' 41
Although a jury would ultimately assess what percentage risk
of disease justifies reasonable distress, it is important to note that
reasonable distress could exist not only in situations where con-
tact with a toxic substance has been definitively proven, but also
in situations where there is only a likelihood that exposure has
occurred."42 Where exposure cannot be proven definitively, the
reasonableness of distress would depend not only on the toxicity
of the substance, but also on the odds that the plaintiff has actu-
ally been exposed to it."4 3 Under this reasoning, reasonable dis-
tress could occur even where exposure cannot be definitively
proven, as long as the feared substance is sufficiently toxic to
make a reasonable person fearful of even a possibility of exposure.
Under the traditional rules, however, which require actual physi-
cal impact or injury, plaintiffs alleging a mere possibility of expo-
GOVERNOR & LEGISLATURE (1981). Although definitive determination of the
presence of dioxin had yet to be determined, the distress of the community
about this possibility was acute. Brown captured the emotional tone of the com-
munity as follows:
The Love Canal people chanted and cursed at meetings with state offi-
cials, cried on the telephone, burned an effigy of the health commis-
sioner, traveled to Albany with a makeshift child's coffin, threatened to
hold officials hostage, sent letters and telegrams to the White House,
held days of mourning and nights of prayer .... All of them watched
with anxiety as each newborn came to the neighborhood, and they
looked at their bodies for signs of cancer .... The psychological scars
are bound to remain among them and their children, along with the
knowledge that, because they have already been exposed [although to
what was still uncertain], they may never fully escape the Love Canal's
insidious grasp.
Brown, Poisoning of America, supra note 1, at 47. As the above excerpt attests to,
substantial distress is possible even where no definitive proof of the presence of
the feared toxin is available. Id.
141. Statistical proof is increasingly accepted in courts to prove causation
in toxin cases. See, e.g., Needham v. White Lab. Inc., 639 F.2d 394 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981) (proving adenoma from DES); Brafford v.
Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14 (D.C. 1984) (proving cancer from uranium
exposure).
142. At Love Canal, for example, residents near the landfill suffered sub-
stantial fear of exposure to dioxin, the most lethal man-made carcinogen, when
it was predicted, based on discovery of related compounds, that tons of dioxin
would eventually be found. See, Brown, Poisoning of America, supra note 2, at 47.
143. A mathematical model should assist the reader in appreciating this
concept. Table I illustrates various ways in which a 30% chance of cancer could
develop given different toxins and different risks of exposure.
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Probability of Overall Resultant
Disease Given Probability of Probability of
Exposure (Toxicity) Exposure Disease
Toxin A 30% 100% 30%
Toxin B 100% 30% 30%
Toxin C 50% 30% 15%
Toxin D 30% 50% 15%
Toxin E 50% 90% 45%
Toxin F 90% 40% 36%
TABLE I: Depicts relationship between degree of toxicity of various toxins and
the probability of exposure as determining the overall chance of disease.
Assume a theoretical jury has determined that a 30% chance of contracting
cancer from a toxin is sufficient to justify compensable emotional distress. See,
e.g., Potter, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 891 (emotional distress may be reasonable even
where chance of disease is less than 50%). The traditional way this 30% chance
would be demonstrated would be to obtain expert testimony attesting to the
finding that the toxin in question causes cancer in 30% of individuals who come
in contact with it. The critical issue here is to realize that, although the toxin
may cause cancer in 30% of people who are exposed to it, plaintiff cannot be
said to be running a 30% risk of cancer until it is definitively proven that he was
in fact exposed to the toxin. If the evidence could only show that plaintiff had a
50-50 chance of being exposed to the toxin, his resultant chance of getting can-
cer would actually be only 15%, which would not meet the jury's justifiable dis-
tress threshold.
Given two hypothetical toxins, Toxin A and Toxin B, one which causes can-
cer in 30% of persons exposed to it (Toxin A in Table I) and one which causes
disease in 100% of persons exposed to it (Toxin B in Table 1), it is important to
note that the 30% overall risk of disease can be met with either toxin, depending
on the proven likelihood that one has been exposed to it. The overall
probability of disease is equal to the probability of cancer given exposure (30%
for Toxin A, 100% for Toxin B) multiplied by the probability that exposure has
in fact occurred. See 12 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 490 (1968)
("the probability of event AB is equal to the product of the probability of A and
the conditional probability of'B given A' "). Thus, for a case involving Toxin A
(causes cancer in 30% of persons exposed to it), a plaintiff seeking to justify
emotional distress to a jury by proving a 30% chance of disease would have to
make a definitive showing of exposure (i.e. 100%). Then the equation would be
(chance of cancer given exposure to Toxin A) * (chance of exposure to Toxin A)
= (30%) * (100%) = 30%. In a case dealing with Toxin B, however (causes
cancer in 100% of persons exposed to it), a definitive showing of exposure
(100%) would yield a 100% chance of cancer, ((chance of exposure given expo-
sure to Toxin B) * (chance of exposure to Toxin B) = (100%) * (100%) =
100%), a literal certainty. Clearly, then, in a case involving Toxin B, the plaintiff
would not have to definitively prove exposure (100%) to justify reasonable dis-
tress. He could actually show a 30% chance of disease by showing that the odds
that he was exposed to the toxin were as low as 30%. ((chance of cancer given
exposure to Toxin B) * (chance of exposure to Toxin B) = (100%) * (30%) =
30%).
As Table I illustrates, a 30% chance of cancer may be achieved in several
ways, given a particular toxin and a particular risk of exposure. The table illus-
trates three toxins (B, E, and F) for which definitive exposure could not be
shown but which nonetheless, given their extreme carcinogenic qualities, create
29
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sure to a highly toxic substance would be denied recovery. 44 As
will be discussed below, this result is not only unjust, but also is
an inefficient allocation of the burden of risk-minimization.' 45
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
As information about the health effects of toxic pollutants
continues to proliferate in the media, 146 public pressure on courts
and legislatures to widen the availability for recovery from the
consequences of toxic pollution will surely increase. 147 More-
over, in those cases where recovery is permitted for emotional
distress, 48 the amount of distress persons reasonably suffer is
naturally increased as the public becomes better informed about
the potential harms of environmental toxins.' 49 While such
changes in public knowledge will naturally have an impact on
those cases where damages for merely foreseeable emotional dis-
tress damages are already permitted, 50 it remains unclear
whether the removal of all physical injury/impact requirements
a 30% or greater risk of disease. Since, according to our hypothetical jury, a
30% chance of disease justifies compensable emotional distress, plaintiffs in the
cases involving Toxins B, E and F suffer compensable distress, even though they
cannot definitively prove exposure. If the physical impact requirement were ad-
hered to, however, only persons exposed to Toxin A could recover. See Payton
v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982) (traditional common-law limita-
tions require affirmative showing of physical injury/impact to support recovery
for emotional distress). Note too that, for toxins B and F, justifiable distress
could be suffered even though the chances of exposure fall below 50%, the
traditional preponderance of the evidence standard that would be used if proof
of actual exposure were required.
144. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
145. For a discussion of the policy considerations that militate for removal
of the physical injury/impact limitations on emotional distress recovery in the
toxic tort context, see infra notes 146-77 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., George Gallup, supra note 1, at 5 (reporting 66% of persons
sampled worry "a great deal" about two environmental concerns that could af-
fect them directly: pollution of drinking water and contamination of soil by toxic
wastes); Government's Report on Radon, supra note 1, at 33 (reporting 81% of
Americans sampled knew of government's report about dangers of radon in
homes).
147. See, e.g., George Gallup, supra note 1, at 5 (large number of Americans
feel that immediate and drastic actions are necessary to avoid major environ-
mental disruptions and are willing to pay economic price to solve problem).
148. Attempts have been made to fashion distinctions between reasonable
and unreasonable emotional distress. See, e.g., Marlowe, Jurisdictional Survey,
supra note 23, at 824-33.
149. The more a person knows about the dangers of a situation the more
reasonable is a given amount of distress upon exposure to that situation. See
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 414 (5th Cir. 1985) (plain-
tiff's fear of cancer reasonably exacerbated each time he learned of another as-
bestos-related death).
150. For a list of jurisdictions no longer requiring a showing of physical
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typified by decisions such as Molien 151 will become the standard in
toxic tort cases.' 52
The arguments for removing the physical injury/impact re-
quirements in this area, in favor of a more straightforward analy-
sis of foreseeability of emotional distress, may be divided into two
types; an argument of social justice and an argument of social util-
ity.' 53 The social justice view supports an unlimited right to re-
cover for reasonable emotional distress by focusing on the right
to be fairly compensated for all injuries caused by the tortious
acts of another and the entitlement to psychic well being. 54 The
social utility view supports recovery for emotional distress dam-
ages as the best way to affect the desired balance between techno-
logical innovation and safety. 155
A. The Social Justice Argument
Supporters of the "Justice" view would loosen restrictions on
recovery for emotional distress in the context of all tort actions,
not just environmental hazard cases.' 56 Justice proponents argue
that emotional distress is a real and deleterious consequence of
certain tortious acts and should be compensated to no less an ex-
tent than any other tort injury.' 57 Concerns over unlimited liabil-
ity and overtaxing valuable activities, often cited in support of
limitations on liability, are rebutted by the Justice proponents
with two arguments. First, they argue, floodgate fears in other
contexts have not materialized and probably will not in this con-
injury/impact or physical manifestation, see Marlowe, Jurisdictional Survey, supra
note 23, at 815 n.186.
151. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980). For a discussion of Molien, see supra notes
44-54, 129-141 and accompanying text.
152. Recovery for the costs of medical monitoring, however, is gaining rap-
idly increasing acceptance in toxic tort cases. In re Paoli R.R. Yard P.C.B. Litiga-
tion, 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990). For a discussion of reasons for redressing
foreseeable emotional distress from the standpoints of both justice and effi-
ciency, see infra notes 153-77 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls for Thee: Towards Full Recovery for
Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV., 333, 341 (1984) [hereinafter Bell, Full Recovery].
Professor Bell calls these the "original" and "instrumental" approaches respec-
tively. The "instrumental" approach "begins with envisioning the desirable so-
ciety and then awarding entitlements most likely to create that society." Id. The
"original" approach "begins with some preexisting authority and awards entitle-
ments as that authority would have awarded ... them." Id.
154. See id. at 341; see generally Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5.
155. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5, at 122.
156. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 153, at 339-41.
157. Bell, supra note 153. See also Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5.
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text.' 5 8 Second, they argue, even if there were a great increase in
claims for emotional distress upon plaintiffs' learning that it is
compensable, this would represent an appropriate increase in re-
covery for a problem out of control.' 59 Thus, argues the Justice
proponent, to deny emotional distress recovery in tort is to unjus-
tifiably deny recovery for the real, long-standing and verifiable re-
sults of a tortious injury, a result contrary to the goal of putting
plaintiff back in the position he was in prior to the tortious
injury. 160
Justice proponents also have concerns that inhere specifically
to the toxic tort context. 161 The concerns here are founded in the
complexity of modern technologies, the latencies of many of the
158. Bell, Full Recovery, supra note 153, at 351 (arguing that advanced na-
ture of psychological/psychiatric examining techniques will help juries weed out
false claims and thus dissuade potential plaintiffs from bringing frivolous
claims).
Experts in the mental health sciences have developed several innovative
means to help identify malingerers and individuals exaggerating their psychic
symptomatology. Submitting the plaintiff for a thorough battery of psychologi-
cal tests and psychodiagnostic interview can often yield information to assist the
fact-finder in making a judgment about the veracity of the plaintiff's claims. See
GARY B. MELTON, ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS (1987) (describing
interview techniques used to assess veracity); R. KEITH GREEN & ARLENE B.
SCHAEFER, FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY: A PRIMER FOR LEGAL AND MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS 84 (1984) (describes methods designed to detect faking on ob-
jective test commonly used in forensic evaluations); see also Stephen D. Husband,
MMPI Characteristics of Litigious versus Non-litigious Female Motor Vehicle Accident Vic-
tims (1989) (unpublished dissertation, Hahnemann University) (identifying de-
tectible personality differences between litigious and non-litigious accident
victims). Marlowe provides a conceptual model for differentiating between ob-
jectively reasonable distress attributable to the tortious conduct and that distress
attributable rather to the idiosyncrasies of the "thin-skulled" plaintiff. Marlowe,
Jurisdictional Survey, supra note 23, at 826 n.240. This model is suggested as a
device to differentiate between that distress that is "reasonable" and thus com-
pensable and that distress that is "unreasonable" and therefore non-compensa-
ble. Id. at 826.
159. Id. "[Iun an age when psychiatry has shown the profound and disas-
trous effects of mental anguish, even in the absence of apparent physical injury,
a refusal to allow recovery for mental anguish would be untenable." See Val
John Christensen, Refining the Traditional Theories of Recovery for Consumer Mental
Anguish, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 81, 86-87 (cited in Brown v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines,
Inc., 185 N.Y.S.2d 923, 926 (1959)).
160. For a discussion of the goals of the tort system, see PROSSER & KEE-
TON, supra note 18, at 17-23.
161. Justice proponents here claim that the practical realities of the toxic
tort context (e.g. the latencies and the uncertainty), make emotional distress all
the more acute. Second, where physical harm will not manifest for years, emo-
tional distress may serve as the only present compensable injury, and thus to
deny him remedy for this would leave him without any redress for his injuries
until he actually contracts the fatal disease that he fears. See Bohrer, Fear and
Trembling, supra note 5, at 87-88.
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illnesses that result from toxic exposure, and the number of peo-
ple that may be affected by one negligent act in this context.' 62
According to this view, the unfettered proliferation of technology,
particularly that involving hazardous processes or substances, has
introduced an angst into our daily lives with which the law has
failed to keep pace. ' 63 The uncertainty inherent in many of these
technologies has largely been ignored as a source of additional
anxiety. Previously, where a plaintiff alleged fear of increased
risk, for example, he was faced with the impossible task of proving
the hazard of a practice whose dangers are still under research.164
Numerous examples are offered where, although a substance was
once regarded as undoubtedly safe, research has later conclu-
sively shown its deleterious effects on health. 165 The Justice pro-
ponents argue that where some evidence has already established
the hazardous nature of a substance or process, emotional dis-
tress is a reasonable response to exposure, even if the full extent
of the danger is not yet known.' 66 To this extent, argues the Jus-
tice proponent, the uncertainty and the anxiety are as menacing
as the factory sludge itself, and treated as an equally real product
of the industrial practice.167
B. The Social Utility Argument
The "Utility" proponents argue for emotional distress recov-
162. Perhaps one of the most convincing arguments for the proposition
that loosening the restriction on emotional distress damages in toxic tort litiga-
tion would result in an overtaxing of valued social activities with tort liability is
the fact that toxic cases, unlike typical tort actions, frequently involve dozens or
hundreds of plaintiffs. See, e.g., Brown, Poisoning of America, supra note 2 (over
1,000 plaintiffs and over $40 million settlement). The counter to this argument,
of course, is that the very magnitude of the hazards dealt with in toxic tort litiga-
tion is an indication of the need for greater control exactly because of the number
of persons affected. If a hazard threatens to impair the quality of life in an entire
township, that hazard should be subject to greater strictures and liability, not less.
See generally Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5. For further discussion of the
magnitude of the hazards presented by modern toxins, see supra notes 59-64 and
accompanying text.
163. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5. See also William R. Ginsberg &
Lois Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 859 (1981).
164. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5, at 124-25.
165. Id. at 126-27.
166. See Bell, Full Recovery, supra note 153 (arguing for recovery for all rea-
sonably foreseeable tort injuries, including emotional distress). See also Jackson
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding plaintiff's
fear of cancer reasonable where plaintiff continued to hear new evidence of
deaths from asbestos exposure).
167. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5, at 122-28.
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ery from a different perspective. 6  Regardless of whether it is
"just" to rescind emotional distress damages, they argue that
such an arrangement would bring about an optimal balance be-
tween innovation and safety.' 69 According to this view, it runs
counter to social utility to have technologies of uncertain risks en-
croaching upon the psychic well-being of citizens. 170 By ex-
tending liability to foreseeable plaintiffs who suffer foreseeable
and reasonable emotional distress, they argue, courts will put in-
dustry on notice to account for the social distress their practices
create. Such companies would then take pains to make their prac-
tices less hazardous to the physical and psychic well-being of sur-
rounding communities. 17'
Some risk and some distress are inevitable in a technological
society, and the "Utility" proponents recognize that to eliminate
all risk would be to eliminate all progress, a result that itself
would detract from social utility.' 72 The question for them,
therefore, is where the cost of that progress should be borne: by
the citizenry alone, or by industry as well.' 73 Where tort liability
does not attach for the reasonable distress created by potentially
hazardous activities, it is the citizen that bears that cost.' 74 Social
utility proponents argue that by making industry liable for the
reasonable distress created by their negligent acts, the cost would
be shared by the party who not only has the economic clout to pay
for the consequences, 75 but who is also in the better position to
find remedial answers. 176 Any other approach, they argue, pro-
vides incentive for industry to transgress the bounds of societal
comfort, presumably the very goal that technology is intended to
promote. ' 77
168. See Bell, Full Recovery, supra note 153, at 341.
169. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5, at 128.
170. Bell, Full Recovery, supra note 153, at 342. See also Bohrer, Fear and
Trembling, supra note 5 at 122-28.
171. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5, at 122-28.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 123.
175. The top fifty United States chemical producers have sales ranging
from $666 million to $12 billion per year. Profits range from $80 million to $1.7
billion per year. Facts and Figures, CHEM. & ENG'G NEws,june 8, 1987, at 24, 36-
37 cited in Meyer, Fate of Toxic Wastes, supra note 62, at 335.
176. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5, at 125. See also Meyer, Fate of
Toxic Wastes, supra note 62, at 335 ("chemical industry employs over 100,000
professional chemists and chemical engineers, including Nobel Prize winners
and other internationally recognized scientists, medical doctors, and
engineers").
177. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling, supra note 5, at 125.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The founding principles of this nation stemmed out of con-
cern for the psychic state of each individual. Liberty, autonomy,
and privacy are essentially means to ensure the psychic integrity
of each of our citizens. Accordingly, we seek to deter those acts
which cause not only physical harms, but also those that offend
individual dignity. For example, we proscribe assault, 78 false im-
prisonment 179 and defamation. 80 We value the serenity of pri-
vate life, the so-called "blessings of liberty,"' 8 ' and we scorn their
uninvited intrusion by others.
In our tort system, we aim not only to redress such encroach-
ments upon our dignity, but also to deter their future occur-
rence.' 8 2 Ascription of tort liability to negligent industrial
behavior that violates human dignity would put corporations on
notice to curb their actions that cause not only physical injuries,
but also the equally real challenges to human dignity entailed in
emotional distress. 83
It remains to be seen whether the delimitation of emotional
distress damages does in fact result in a flood of litigation and an
overtaxing of valuable industrial activities. Such fears are over-
stated. Quite contrary to impeding the mission of industry in our
society, the ascription of liability to industry's negligent and reck-
less incursions upon our emotional serenity will actually further
the purported purpose of industrialization - that of reducing du-
ress and hardship, not merely transferring it to those who happen
to live near our industrial facilities.
Adam P. Rosen
178. Vietnamese Fisherman's Assoc. v. Knights of the Klu Klux Klan, 518
F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1981). See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35
(1965).
179. Meadows v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 254 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Fla. 1966).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1965).
180. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965).
181. U.S. CONST., preamble.
182. United States v. Carrol Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
183. For a discussion of the encroachment on dignitary interests entailed in
toxic exposure, see supra notes 59-86 and accompanying text.
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